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NOTE
Do Judicial "Scarlet Letters" Violate the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
of .the Eighth Amendment?
"[A] penalty which, in our days, would infer a degree of mocking infamy
and ridicule, might then be invested with almost as stem a dignity as the
punishment of death itself."1
Introduction
In an attempt to reduce escalating correctional facility costs and
prison overcrowding as well as find a more effective form of punishment,
some trial judges have begun imposing "scarlet letter" probation condi-
tions on convicted defendants. These creative sentences can be effective
punishments2 because they expose individuals involved in "antisocial"
conduct to public scrutiny.'
In three recently decided cases, Goldschmitt' v. State,4 State v.
Kirby,5 and State v. Bateman,6 judges imposed scarlet letter probation
conditions upon the convicted defendants. After a Florida trial court
convicted Arthur Goldschmitt for driving under the influence of alcohol
(D.U.I.),7 the trial judge placed Goldschmitt on probation. As a special
condition of the probation, the judge ordered Goldschmitt to place a
bumper sticker on his car reading, "CONVICTED D.U.I. - RE-
STRICTED LICENSE.""
1. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 41 (Norton Critical 2d ed. 1978) (1850).
2. For the purposes of this Note, probation and probation conditions will be treated as
forms of punishment. "[I]ncidents of probation emphasize-that a probation order is 'an au-
thorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the probation being intended as a re-
forming discipline.'" Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943) (quoting Cooper
v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937)).
3. Punishments "are effective which have the impact of the 'scarlet letter' described by
Nathaniel Hawthorne." United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 741 F.2d 1542 (1984).
4. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. No. 85-1649 (Or. Cir. Ct. for Lincoln County, March 7, 1986).
6. Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-10-34220 (Or. Cir. Ct. for Multnomah County, June 17,
1986).
7. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (1987); infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
8. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 124.
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In an Oregon court, Thomas Everitt Kirby pleaded guilty to a
charge of first degree burglary.9 He was placed on probation and was
required to place his picture in a local newspaper along with an apology
to the public. 10
In another Oregon court, Richard James Bateman pleaded no con-
test to charges of first degree sexual abuse." Mr. Bateman received five
years probation subject to several conditions, one of which required him
to place signs upon the door of his residence and on both doors of any car
he may drive reading, "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO
CHILDREN ALLOWED."
12
Each of these creative probation conditions breaches the anonymity
of a typical probation sentence.13 Under normal probation conditions,
the public may learn of an individual's criminal conduct through news-
paper, radio, and television coverage, but his or her criminal record is not
public information. Because an individual's criminal record is not public
information, and because news quickly grows stale, an individual's crimi-
nal status often remains unknown or quickly disappears from public
awareness.
Judicial scarlet letters, such as Mr. Goldschmitt's bumper sticker,
Mr. Kirby's newspaper picture and apology, and Mr. Bateman's signs,
not only announce to the general public that the individual has commit-
ted a crime, but also announce the crime. Unlike typical probation condi-
tions,"' a scarlet letter constantly associates the bearer with the crime
committed. Thus, these probation conditions expose defendants to the
possibility of public persecution. For this and other reasons, scarlet let-
ter punishments raise serious questions of constitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments. 15
The goals of typical probation conditions are to relieve or avoid in-
stitutional overcrowding and stress, 16 as well as to promote rehabilita-
9. See OR. REV. STAT. § 164.055 (1987 & 1988 SUPP.); infra notes 132-40 and accompa-
nying text.
10. Judgment and Sentencing Order at 2, Kirby (No. 85-1649).
11. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.425(1)-(2) (1983); infra notes 141-78 and accompanying
text.
12. Judgment and Probation Order at 2, Bateman (Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-10-
34220).
13. "Typical probation conditions include obedience to the law, restricting access to
automobiles, limiting access to certain places or people, and mandatory participation in coun-
seling programs." N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 186
(1983).
14. See supra note 13.
15. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
16. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, JAILS: INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF A LOCAL PROBLEM 68 (1984) (Research indicates that "at least
tion. 17 As rehabilitation becomes increasingly unattainable,18 there has
been a shift away from this goal toward other objectives19 such as retri-
bution, deterrence, and incapacitation.2"
The judges who sentenced Goldschmitt, Kirby, and Bateman proba-
bly imposed scarlet letter probation conditions hoping that shame would
deter the defendants from committing similar crimes in the future.21 A
scarlet letter punishment probably also increases public awareness of a
convicted defendant's criminal past.
The deterrent effect of shame and increased public awareness has
been utilized in the past. Prior to 1776, humiliating devices such as pillo-
ries22 and bilboes2 a were used extensively in the colonies.24 Although
colonial sentences did not order the infliction of pain, pain was often part
of the punishment because the public threw stones and other objects at
the helpless convicts.25 These forms of punishment were eventually elim-
inated when each was found to constitute a form of cruel and unusual
punishment.26
Like pillories and bilboes, today's judicial scarlet letters are not di-
rect physical punishments. Instead, they are used as a "form of penance
and a warning to potential wrongdoers."12 7 A scarlet letter also probably
increases public awareness of the defendant's criminal activity, thus ham-
pering his or her criminal tendencies. But, because it creates the poten-
63% of all adults under correctional supervision are serving their sentences under some form
of probation.") [hereinafter JAILS].
17. S. SHANE-DuBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 4 (National Institute of Justice Issues and Prac-
tices, 1988).
18. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
19. JAILS, supra note 16, at 87-88.
20. Id. at 87.
21. "The deterrent, and thus the rehabilitative effect of punishment may be heightened if
it 'inflicts disgrace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner.'" Goldschmitt v.
State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting United States v. William Ander-
son Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982));.see also Proceedings at 17-18, Bateman (Nos. C85-
08-33209 and C85-10-34220).
22. The typical pillory, a device for publicly punishing offenders, consisted of a wooden
frame with adjustable boards erected on a post. The offender's head and hands were thrust
through holes in the boards and locked into place. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1716 (4th ed. 1976); see Hentig, The Pillory: A Medieval Punishment, 11 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 186, 197-98 (1939).
23. A bilbo is a long, heavy bar of iron, having two sliding shackles for the offender's legs.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 215 (4th ed. 1976); see Eaton, Puni-
tive Pain and Humiliation, 6 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 894, 897 (1916).
24. A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 142 (1968); Eaton, supra note
23, at 897-900; State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 592, 190 A.2d 514, 516 (1963).
25. L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 3 (1975); Hen-
tig, supra note 22, at 197-98.
26. L. BERKSON, supra note 25, at 5.
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tial for public persecution of defendants, this modem sentencing
technique may also be a cruel and unusual punishment.,
This Note addresses the question whether modem judicial scarlet
letters are cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Part One sketches general sentencing
theory, including the background and modem trend of sentencing struc-
tures, objectives of incarceration, and modem sentencing theory. Part
Two discusses the history of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.
Part Three sets out the Supreme Court's test for unusual punishments in
non-capital punishment cases. Finally, this Note analyzes the
Goldschmitt, Kirby, and Bateman sentences in light of sentencing theory
and eighth amendment jurisprudence. Although each of the three
sentences exposes the convict, to the risk of public persecution, the author
argues that Goldschmitt's'and Kirby's senten'es are unlikely to subject
them to persecution, whereas Bateman's sentence may subject him to se-
vere negative public reaction. Giving weight to this difference, this Note
concludes that some judicial scarlet letters are cruel and unusual punish-
ment and some are not.
I. Sentencing Theory
A. Sentencing Structures and Objectives of Incarceration
Each state has its own penal code and related laws that establish
sentencing and release policies.2" State. sentencing statutes can be divided
into three general categories based on the amount of discretion vested in
trial court judges and parole officials: indeterminate, determinate, and
mandatory minimum sentence.29
Under an indeterminate system, the sentence is set for a range of
time (e.g., two to five years) rather than for a specific amount of time
(e.g., two years).30 Under a determinate system, a legislatively deter-
28. See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125 (quoting William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 913).
29. JAILS, supra note 16, at 86-87.
30. "This system was called indeterminate because the prisoner's actual time in prison
would not be known, or determined, until final release by the parole board .... [I]ts primary
theoretical rationale was that it permitted sentencing and parole release decisions to be individ-
ual, often on the basis of the offender's rehabilitation progress or prospects." R. SINGER, SEN-
TENCING I (National Institute of Justice Crime File Study Guide) [hereinafter SENTENCING].
Under an indeterminate system, the judge has a great deal of discretion at sentencing,
including power to imprison the defendant, place the defendant on probation, or set conditions
on probation. If the judge sentences the defendant to imprisonment, the sentence will be for a
range of time rather than for a specified amount of time. The paroling authority is then usu-
ally responsible for determining, within limits set by the sentencing judge or by statute, the
exact date of release from prison and when correctional jurisdiction will end. JAILS, supra note
16, at 87.
The following states have indeterminate sentencing structures: District of Columbia, Kan-
sas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 91.
mined length of time effectively sets the maximum sentence that the
judge may impose.3 Under a mandatory minimum sentence system, a
statutorily mandated sentence must be imposed in all cases upon
conviction.32
State legislatures decide which sentencing structure, or combination
of structures, the state will follow:33 "These decisions are framed to a
large extent by legislative policy, reflecting the public's views on crime
and on the purposes of incarceration., 34 The'purposes of incarceration
can be sorted generally into four categories: retribution, deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and rehabilitation.35
When the object is retribution, the sentence is an end in itself, a
punishment for the crime. Retribution stresses fitting the punishment to
the crime.36 The other three caiegorie-:- deterr'ence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation-may be characterized as "utilitarian" because all three
are designed to reduce or control crime.37 Deterrence furthers this utili-
tarian goal by making the sentence severe enough to discourage people
from committing the crime.38 The object of the incapacitation category
is to remove "presumptively high-risk individuals" from society, thus
preventing them from committing crimes. 39 The object of the rehabilita-
tion category is to correct an individual's criminal behavior to create a
useful, functioning member of society.'
31. Both the judge's and the paroling authority's discretion is more limited under a deter-
minate system than under an indeterminate system. Actual release and termination dates are
influenced by administrative rules allowing reduced terms for good behavior. JAILS, supra,
note 16, at 87.
The following states have a determinate sentencing structure: California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, and North Carolina. Id. at 91.
32. The judge's discretion is most limited under the mandatory minimum sentence sys-
tem, also called a partially indeterminate system. The court retains power to set the maximum
sentence, but it has no authority over the minimum sentence. The paroling authority is re-
sponsible for setting the actual term, but probation in -lieu of imprisonment is not available,
and parole is either not permitted or available only after an unusually long confinement. Id. at
87.
The following states have mandatory minimum sentencing structures: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 91.
33. Id. at 87.
34. Id. at 86.





40. Id. "Criminologists long accepted the view that an offender's criminal misbehavior
could be analogized to a disease, which could be cured if properly treated in a proper institu-
tion. Cure became a major goal of both sentencing and incarceration; when released, the of-
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B. The Demise of the Rehabilitation Objective
Until 1972, judges in most states had broad discretion to sentence a
defendant to probation or incarceration, depending on the offense.41 In
recent years, however, judges' discretion has been widely restricted by
the passage of mandatory sentencing laws, habitual offender (recidivist)
statutes, and sentencing guidelines.42
The restriction of sentencing discretion can be traced to several
sources. Prior to 1970, rehabilitation of offenders was the primary objec-
tive of most correctional systems.43 In the first half of the century, most
states passed indeterminate sentencing statutes in order to advance this
objective. By the mid-1970s, a significant number of state correctional
systems had shifted their emphasis from rehabilitation to deterrence, in-
capacitation, and retribution.' This change reflected legislative desires
to control criminal offenders more effectively, to minimize differences in
time served by prisoners for similar offenses, and to minimize inequities
in conditions of release, which were inevitable under an indeterminate
sentencing system. 5
By 1970, rehabilitation programs had become a popular subject for
research.46 The programs were evaluated according to their effects on
later offenses or recidivism.47 Several prominent reviews of this research
concluded that there was no evidence that rehabilitation programs
fender would enjoy a more satisfying, productive, and lawful life; he would not commit
additional crimes and everyone's interests would be served." SENTENCING, supra note 30, at 1.
41. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE REPORTS, FISCAL YEARS 1980 AND
1981, 41 (1982) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH]; SENTENCING, supra note 30, at
1.
42. J. PERLSTEIN & D. HENRY, DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH CROWDED JAILS: A
MANUAL FOR JUDGES 21 (National Institute of Justice, 1986) [hereinafter DEALING EFFEC-
TIVELY WITH CROWDED JAILS].
Mandatory sentencing laws require prison sentences; the main motivations for such laws
are deterrence and incapacitation. JAILS, supra note 16, at 88. Some states have also enacted
habitual offender (recidivist) statutes, which require mandatory sentences for habitual offend-
ers. Id. Sentencing guidelines attempt to standardize sentences primarily on the basis of the
crime and the offender's criminal record. SENTENCING, supra note 30, at 2.
Mandatory sentencing laws are America's most popular sentencing innovation. M.
TONRY, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS 25 (National Institute of Justice Issues and Practices,
1987) [hereinafter SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS]. By 1983, 49 states had adopted such laws
for offenses other than murder or drunk driving. Most of the mandatory sentencing laws apply
to drug offenses, felonies involving firearms, or felonies committed by persons who have previ-
ous felony convictions. Id.
43. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 45.
44. Id.; see SENTENCING, supra note 30, at 2.
45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 45; SENTENCING, supra note 30 at 2.




worked.48 In retrospect, "nothing works" appears to have been too
harsh a conclusion.4 9 "Both critics and correctional professionals soon
abandoned claims that offenders should be incarcerated for rehabilita-
tion, or, as a corollary, that parole boards could make reliable judgments
as to whether or when a prisoner was sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant
release." 0 This reduced confidence in rehabilitation programs weakened
resistance to proposals for change."1 Legislatures that adopted reforms
were probably influenced by 1982 opinion polls showing that the public
generally favored a "tough policy" for dealing with crime and lawless-
ness. 2 The public also felt that laws and courts were too lenient and
penalties were not stiff enough. 3 Polls suggest that "the public holds
that deterrence and incapacitation rather than rehabilitation ... are the
primary goals of incarceration."
'54
Although about one-fourth of those individuals ordered to pay resti-
tution fail to do so, restitution programs are also popularly endorsed by
citizens and criminal justice officials.5 5 Even the offenders assigned to
community work programs, through which offenders "reimburse" soci-




When policy makers and the public grew disenchanted with rehabil-
itation, the emphasis of sentencing schemes shifted to retribution, deter-
48. Id. A 1975 publication, known as the "Martinson study," D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON
& J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT, A SURVEY OF TREAT-
MENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975), was considered by many to be the first comprehensive
analysis of research on rehabilitation techniques. The gist of the analysis was that "nothing
works." SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS, supra note 42, at 7. The research surveyed indicated
that while some forms of rehabilitation were successful, most were not. The researchers con-
cluded that rehabilitation had "not been shown to motivate or equip offenders to discontinue
their criminal careers." CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 45.
In 1981, this conclusion was supported by a special panel of the National Academy of
Science. After completing a comprehensive review of rehabilitation theory and related re-
search, the panel concluded that "little systematic, consistent evidence can be found in the
research literature to support the concept of rehabilitation." Id. at 48.
49. A 1976 statistical study of probation presented to Congress by the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States concluded that poor probation results "stem from inadequate treat-
ment services, a lack of dependable information to guide judges in deciding who should be
placed on probation, and especially the problem of caseloads which are so high that probation
officers are unable to perform their supervisory duties effectively." CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-




52. J. LEGGE & L. WEBB, REMOVAL OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS FROM ADULT JAILS: A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT, POLICY PERSPECTIVES 2
(1982); JAILS, supra note 16, at 88.
53. J. LEGGE & L. WEBB, supra note 52, at 230.
54. JAILS, supra note 16, at 88.
55. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 50.
56. Id.
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rence, and incapacitation. Many states adopted statutory schemes 57 that
curtail judicial and administrative discretion in determining the length of
sentences." Because judges and paroling authorities are left with less
discretion, convicted defendants are "often sentenced more severely than
they would be in the absence of... mandatory [sentencing and recidivist]
law[s]." 59 As a result, the states have experienced a tremendous increase
in both prison and jail populations 60 and the resulting costs of new cor-
rectional facilities.6I
C. Modern Sentencing Theory
Notwithstanding the statutory limitations discussed above, trial
court judges have a great deal of discretion when sentencing a convicted
defendant.62 Faced with prison systems that are both expensive and
chronically overcrowded, judges are exercising their discretion to fashion
alternatives to incarceration.63 Alternative sentences include probation,
suspended sentences, fines, community service, restitution to the victim,
halfway house placement, or treatment programs such as alcohol rehabil-
itation.64 These traditional measures are not always successful. For ex-
ample, probation of convicted felons, the most common form of
correctional supervision program, was closely scrutinized by the Rand
Corporation in 1985.65 The Rand Corporation's researchers conducted
studies in two California counties, Los Angeles and Alameda, and found
that almost two-thirds of those placed on probation were rearrested. Vi-
olent crimes comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the new
offenses.
6 6
57. See supra note 42.
58. Id.; JAILS, supra note 16, at 91.
59. SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS, supra note 42, at 26.
60. From 1972 to 1979, prison and jail populations nationwide increased 50%. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 41. In 1979, the total number of prisoners under the
jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities was 480,500. During the next five
years, it increased to 685,700, representing a 43% increase from 1979 to 1984. In 1985, the
national correctional facility population was 113.9% of capacity, with a low of 86.4% in North
Dakota and a high of 234% in West Virginia. As a result of this overcrowding, 18,617 prison-
ers were released early in 1985. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, at 179 (1987) [hereinafter STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT].
61. In 1985, expenditures by state correctional facilities exceeded eight billion dollars.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MAKING CONFINEMENT
DECISIONS 1 (1987).
62. DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH CROWDED JAILS, supra note 42, at 21.
63. A. HALL, SYSTEMWIDE STRATEGIES TO ALLEVIATE JAIL CROWDING 4 (National
Institute of Justice Research in Brief, 1987).
64. Id.
65. J. PETERSILIA, S. TURNER, J. KAHAN & J. PETERSON, GRANTING FELONS PROBA-
TION: PUBLIC RISKS AND ALTERNATIVES (Rand Corporation, 1985).
66. Id. at vi.
Nor is restitution an ideal alternative, despite its popularity. 67 In
1981, the National Institute of Justice, through its National Evaluation
Program, completed a nationwide assessment of restitution programs.'
The Institute found that approximately one-fourth of those ordered to
pay restitution failed to do so,6 8 and that the larger the restitution,
amount, the less likely the offender was to pay it.69
Sentencing judges are in a difficult position. Incarceration adds to
prison overpopulation 70 and costs,71 and traditional sentencing alterna-
tives do not always achieve the desired objectives.72 Some judges faced
with this Hobson's choice have devised creative sentencing alternatives.
Creative sentencing raises a constitutional issue: When is a scarlet letter
a valid sentencing alternative, and when does it constitute a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
II. History of the Eighth Amendment
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
During the early colonial years, imprisonment was usually an in-
terim step in the penal process.7 3 The defendant was confined while
awaiting trial and, if convicted, punishment. With the exception of those
who received the death penalty, convicted criminals were released after
execution of the penalty.74
There is little evidence that any significant number of colonials were
ever gibbeted,75 beheaded, or drawn and quartered. 6 But, whipping,
During the 40-month follow-up period of our study, 65 percent of the probationers
[studied] were rearrested, 51 percent were reconvicted, 18 percent were convicted of
serious violent crimes (homicide, rape, weapons offenses, assault, and robbery), and
34 percent were reincarcerated. Moreover, 75 percent of the official charges filed
[against the probationers] involved burglary/theft, robbery, and other violent
crimes-the crimes most threatening to public safety.
Id. at vi-vii.
67. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
68. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 50.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 60.
71. See supra note 61.
72. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
73. R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONvICTION 20-21 (1973).
74. Id.
75. A gibbet was a gallows, an upright post with an arm projecting from the top, on which
convicted defendants were hung in chains and allowed to remain as a warning. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 955 (4th ed. 1976).
76. L. BERKSON, supra note 25, at 4; Black, Torture Under English Law, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 344, 348 (1927); A. BONFONTI, THE WITCHCRAFT HYSTERIA OF 1692, at 48-53 (1971);
State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 593 (1963); Done v. People, 5 Parker's Crim. Rep. 364, 383-84
(N.Y. 1863).
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mutilation, and branding77 were among the punishments used, as well as
such humiliating devices as pillories, ducking stools,78 stocks, and bil-
boes.79 Many, if not most, of the sentences were publicly inflicted or
designed to alter the offender's physical appearance to indicate status.80
While physical pain was generally not an intended consequence of most
sentences, it often accompanied such punishment.81
B. Adoption of the Eighth Amendment
No bill of rights was contained in the document proposed and de-
bated by the Constitutional Convention in 1789.82 On June 8, 1789,
James Madison introduced the first draft of a federal Bill of Rights into
the United States House of Representatives.83 His fourth article included
the following provision: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
'84
When the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
ratified by the states on December 15, 1791,85 cruel and unusual punish-
ment was prohibited.86 The Bill of Rights was originally held to apply
only to the federal government, not to the states.87 In 1962, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Clause (the
Clause) was fully applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88
77. Paine, Jocular and Infamous Punishments, 114 LAW TIMES 479 (March 21, 1903); W.
ANDREWS, BYGONE PUNISHMENTS (2d ed. 1931); A. EARLE, supra note 24, at 140; Thomp-
son, Early Corporal Punishments, 6 ILL. L.Q. 37, 43 (1923); Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264, 267
(1883).
78. A ducking stool was a chair into which convicted defendants were tied to be plunged
into water. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 698 (4th ed. 1976).
79. See generally supra notes 22-25.
80. Id.
81. L. BERKSON, supra note 25, at 13; Hentig, supra note 22, at 197-98.
82. A. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 587-88 (1911).
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
84. Id. (emphasis added). On June 12, 1776, the Virginia Declaration of Rights was
adopted. Article nine of the Declaration stated, "Excessive bail ought not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This sentence was
taken from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, but its principle can be traced back to
1215 and the Magna Carta. The language Madison chose was very similar to the language in
the English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Declaration of Rights, but he made an important
change in the wording of his clause. Madison's decision to use the imperative "shall" instead
of the flaccid "ought" implies that he believed the prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was so fundamental that it required stronger wording than had been used in the
previous documents.
85. T. CALVERT, 2 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 341 n.1 (1924).
86. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
87. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 n.1 (1988).
88. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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While the Eighth Amendment precluded many colonial forms of
punishment, it did not immediately abolish all of them. For example, it
was not until 1839 that Congress finally abolished the penalties of whip-
ping and standing pillory.89
C. Interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Clause
The Supreme Court has held that the language of the Clause
manifests "an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the
criminal law function of government,"9 ° and that the Clause was
designed to "protect those convicted of crimes."91 Justice Brennan, con-
curring in Furman v. Georgia,92 interpreted the Clause to require "[t]he
State, even as it punishes, [to] treat its members with respect for their
intrinsic worth as human beings."93 In the same opinion, Brennan also
stated, "[t]he fundamental premise of the clause [is] that even the vilest
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." 94
If courts had merely to measure challenged punishments against
those punishments that have long been condemned, their analytical work
would be relatively simple.95 But this "narrow and unwarranted view of
the Clause... was left behind with the 19th century."9 6 When analyzing
an allegedly cruel and unusual punishment under the Clause, a court
must look to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."97
D. Judicial Analysis Under the Eighth Amendment
In non-capital punishment cases, the Supreme Court has generally
interpreted the Clause as forbidding either the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain98 or sentences grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime committed. 99
89. Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, 5 Stat. 321-22 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3564 (1982))
(repealed 1986).
90. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 664 (1977)).
91. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 644 n.40.
92. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972).
93. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 273.
95. Id. at 269.
96. Id.
97. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
98. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910); Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
99. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Trop, 356 U.S. at
100; Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
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1. Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain
Justice Field, dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont, " stated that barbaric
punishments include "punishments which inflict torture, such as the
rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the
like," noting specifically that these were accompanied by "acute pain and
suffering."101 Nonetheless, these forms of punishment have been con-
demned for reasons beyond the simple condemnation of physical pain
and suffering. 102 As the Court wrote, "The true significance of these
punishments is that they treat members of the human race as
nonhumans." 1
03
As noted in Furman v. Georgia,"° the Framers of the Eighth
Amendment recognized that a punishment may be cruel and unusual
although it does not inflict bodily pain or mutilation. Even if a punish-
ment involves no " 'physical mistreatment, no primitive torture,' severe
mental pain may be inherent in the infliction of [the punishment]."10 5
The Court considered the issue of cruel and unusual punishment
and mental pain in Weems v. United States.1°6 The defendant was con-
victed of falsifying a public document and sentenced to fifteen years im-
prisonment with hard labor in chains and permanent deprivation of his
civil liberties.'0 7 The Supreme Court held that Mr. Weems' punishment
violated the Clause because of the physical and mental pain inflicted.
"His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years,
but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is
forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and
view of the criminal magistrate ....,
The defendant in Trop v. Dulles'0 9 was convicted of desertion after
an unauthorized leave from his military unit for less than a day. The
trial court sentenced Mr. Trop to involuntary exile." 0 In a plurality de-
cision, the Supreme Court held Trop's punishment was cruel and unu-
sual under the Clause:
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the
Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-
100. 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892).'
101. Id. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting); see also Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409, 32 N.E.
1019, 1021 (1893) (Supreme Court of Indiana held Clause contemplates punishments such as
whipping, pillorying, burning at the stake, and breaking on the wheel).
102. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 272-73.
104. Id. at 271; see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
105. Furman, 408 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Weems, 217
U.S. at 366.
106. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
107. Id. at 358.
108. Id. at 366.
109. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
110. Id. at 107.
increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations
may be established against him, what proscriptions may be di-
rected against him... [Mr. Trop] may be subject to banishment, a
fate universally decried by civilized people. 11'
As it had in Weems, the Court found that the mental pain associated
with the sentence made the sentence unconstitutional.
2. Sentence Disproportionate to Crime
The Supreme Court adopted a test for proportionality of sentences
'in Coker v. Georgia,112 but the Court's holdings in Rummel v.- Estelle "
3
and Hutto v. Davis" 4 restricted application of the test to death penalty
cases. 1 5 In Solem v. Helm," 6 the Court liberalized its approach, al-
lowing application of the proportionality test to noncapital cases and set-
ting forth an objective test for cruel and unusual punishment.' 
7
Despite its liberalizing tone, Solem did not overrule Rummel."
8
However, lower courts are reluctant to apply the Solem proportionality
test unless the sentence is for life without the possibility of parole. Be-
cause many courts are reluctant to use the Solem proportionality test,
analysis of the constitutionality of scarlet letter probation conditions may
be limited to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain test.'
11. Id. at 102.
112. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
113. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
114. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
115. Note, Solem v. Helm: The Supreme Court Extends the Proportionality Requirement to
Sentences of Imprisonment, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1401, 1408.
116. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
117. Note, supra note 115, at 1408.
118. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288 n.13. •
119. Mackey, Rationality versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the Constitutional Limits on
Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. RaV. 623, 633-34 (1984) ("In the short time since [Solem]
was decided, federal and state courts have shown a notable reluctance to recognize proportion-
ality claims. In fact, the treatment of [Solem] by later cases suggests that proportionality re-
view may be limited to life sentences without the possibility of parole."); Baker v. Huntsville,
516 So. 2d 927, 931 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (Solem proportionality analysis only applies to
sentences of life imprisonment without parole.); see also Project, Seventeenth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987 76 GEO.
L.J. 521, 1112 (1988) ("Some of the circuit courts specifically limit an extensive proportional-
ity review to sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Others have virtually disre-
garded the Solem proportionality principle."). But see Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379
(Wyo. 1986) (dictum) ("[I]n cases where the mode of punishment is unusual" court will "en-
gage in a lengthy analysis under all three of the Solem criteria."); United States v. Butler, 817
F.2d 1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (prima facie case of excessive forfeiture under Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) requires sentencing court to do Solem propor-
tionality analysis); Bradley, Proportionality in Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An Eighth
Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 210-11 (1986-1987) (Solem "effectively wrote
Rummel out of the body of eighth amendment case law. The Court reaffirmed that the Clause
indeed forbids the infliction of any punishment, capital or otherwise, that is not commensurate
with the gravity of the offense.").
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3. Judicial Review of Legislatively Mandated Sentences
Courts should be reluctant to "review legislatively mandated terms
of imprisonment,""'2 and "successful challenges to the proportionality
of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare."' 2 ' The Supreme
Court is extremely reluctant to question the appropriateness of criminal
sentences. 122
"On the breast of her gown, in fine red cloth, surrounded with an elabo-




A. Goldschmitt v. State:124 "CONVICTED D.U.I. - RESTRICTED
LICENSE"
Arthur Goldschmitt was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol.'2 5 He was convicted and, because he was a first-time D.U.I.
offender, was placed on probation. 126 A special condition of his proba-
tion required him to place a bumper sticker on his car reading, "CON-
VICTED D.U.I. - RESTRICTED LICENSE."'
127
Mr. Goldschmitt appealed the bumper sticker probation condition.
Comparing the bumper sticker to the pillory, he argued that the bumper
sticker was cruel and unusual punishment and, therefore, violated the
Clause. The Florida Court of Appeals, unpersuaded by Mr.
Goldschmitt's argument, affirmed the sentence.'
28
120. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (emphasis added).
121. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 383 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
122. See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. 263. Rummel was sentenced to mandatory life imprison-
ment under Texas' habitual criminal statute. Rummel had been convicted of three felonies:
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of
goods, and passing a $28.36 forged check. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held
that the mandatory life sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment. See also Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370. Davis, convicted for distributing marijuana and possession with intent to
distribute, was fined $20,000 and sentenced to 40 years in prison. The Supreme Court held
that the sentence was not cruel and unusual.
123. N. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 43.
124. 490 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
125. Id. at 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 125-26.
L Eighth Amendment Analysis of Goldschmitt's Punishment
The Florida Court of Appeals stated that the differences between the
degrading physical rigors of the pillory and the unwanted publicity of the
bumper sticker far outweighed the similarities between the two punish-
ments.129 The court stated that this scarlet letter probation condition did
not offend the Constitution, and held that "[t]he deterrent, and thus the
rehabilitative effect of punishment may be heightened if it 'inflicts dis-
grace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner.' "130 But,
even as it affirmed Goldschmitt's scarlet letter probation condition, the
appellate court recognized that such a creative probation condition could
offend constitutional standards.
1 3 1
Implicit in the Florida appellate court's dictum is a recognition that
a cruel and unusual punishment argument could prevail in certain cir-
cumstances. Thus, had Mr. Goldschmitt presented evidence showing
that he was physically or mentally injured by the probation condition,
the court might have looked more favorably on his pillory analogy argu-
ment and ruled in his favor. Because he did not present adequate evi-
dence to support his argument, the court correctly concluded that his
bumper sticker probation condition did not involve an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of mental or physical pain, and was therefore not cruel
and unusual punishment.
B. State v. Kirby:132 "I apologize .... ,,133
Thomas Everett Kirby pleaded guilty to first degree burglary.
134
Mr. Kirby was placed on probation with the Oregon Corrections Divi-
sion for thirty months. 135 One of the conditions of his probation required
him to publish, at his own expense, an advertisement known as a "Crimi-
nal's Apology," in the Newport News-Times. 136 On April 30, 1986, Mr.
Kirby's picture and self-written apology appeared in the paper. 137
129. Id. at 125.
130. Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
131. Id. at 126.
132. No. 85-1649 (Or. Cir. Ct. for Lincoln County 1986).
133. Judgment and Sentencing Order, Kirby, No. 85-1649 (Or. Cir Ct. for Lincoln County,
March 7, 1986).
134. Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, Kirby, No. 85-1649 (March 2, 1986).
135. Judgment and Sentencing Order, Kirby at 1. Mr. Kirby was also required as part of
his probation to perform 80 hours of community service and to pay a fine.
136. Id. at 2.
137. See Newport News-Times, April 30, 1986, at A2. In addition to the photograph and
the apology, the ad, entitled "CRIMINAL'S APOLOGY," contained a summary of the facts
under which Kirby was convicted, his sentence, his prior criminal record, and his address.
Also included was a section entitled "CRIME STOPPERS TIP":
As the jails and penitentiaries fill up and criminals remain in the community, be
aware of which of your neighbors pose a threat to you and your family. Don't hesti-
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To alleviate prison overcrowding and use county jail cells more effi-
ciently, 138 Newport, Oregon has enacted a program that requires certain
convicted criminals to make public apologies in lieu of incarceration.
139
Local law enforcement officials consider the program successful because
it has raised defendants' awareness of their personal conduct and the
public's awareness of criminal activity."
1. Eighth Amendment Analysis of Kirby's Sentence
Publicity effects of the Criminal's Apology are essentially the same
as those of a news story on the individual's criminal conduct. News cov-
erage of an individual's criminal conduct has not yet resulted in a suc-
cessful cruel and unusual punishment challenge. Therefore the
Criminal's Apology probably does not inflict the degree of physical or
mental pain needed to find that a punishment is unnecessary and wanton.
Nevertheless, this public apology probation condition could offend
constitutional standards. As the Goldschmitt dictum indicated, 1 ' under
different circumstances Kirby might have prevailed with a cruel and unu-
sual punishment argument. For instance, if he had presented evidence to
the court showing that he was physically or mentally abused as a result
of his Criminal's Apology, Kirby would strengthen his cruel and unusual
punishment argument and the court could rule in his favor.
C. State v. Bateman:'42 "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO
CHILDREN ALLOWED"
In October of 1985, two indictments for first degree sexual abuse'43
were filed against Richard James Bateman in Multnomah County, Ore-
gon for sexual abuse of a five-year-old girl and a six-year-old boy. Both
children were neighbors of Mr. Bateman. He pleaded no contest to the
charges in both cases.'" This was not the first time Mr. Bateman was
accused and convicted of sexual abuse.145 When he appeared for sen-
tate [sic] to call a person's probation officer or the police if you observe any suspi-
cious activity on their [sic] part. Be aware of who has been convicted of crimes and
who may be committing crimes in your neighborhood.
138. Letter from Ulys J. Stapleton, District Attorney, Lincoln County, Oregon, to Gregory
M. Brown (Jan. 5, 1988) (discussing public criminal apologies).
139. Id.
140. Id. This program is authorized by OR. REv. STAT. § 137.540(2) (1988 Supp.) ("In
addition to the general conditions, the court may impose special conditions of probation for
the protection of the public or reformation of the offender, or both. .. ").
141. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 126; see supra text following note 131.
142. State v. Bateman, Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-10-34220 (Or. Cir. Ct. for Multnomah
County, Oct. 11, 1985).
143. OR. REV. STATf. § 163.425 (1)-(2) (1983).
144. Appellant's Brief at 2, State v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App., Nov. 1987).
145. On August 27, 1978, Mr. Bateman was accused of sexually abusing a neighbor's six-
year-old girl. After an investigation into this occurrence, the victim's parents told the district
attorney that they did not wish to proceed with the case because they feared that their daugh-
tencing, 146 Bateman faced a maximum of five years imprisonment and a
$100,000 fine for each conviction. 47 However, the court suspended the
prison sentences and placed Bateman on five years formal supervised
probation under the Corrections Division of the State of Oregon.
141
Among the conditions of Mr. Bateman's probation were the require-
ments that he report as often as directed to the Corrections Division, and
not violate any laws. 149 The court also specified eleven special probation
conditions, including the following:
(9) that he place upon his door of residence, in three (3) inch let-
tering, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO CHILDREN
ALLOWED,... and
(11) that on any vehicle he may operate he place signs on both
doors that read DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO CHIL-
DREN ALLOWED.
150
Mr. Bateman has filed an appeal with the Oregon Court of Appeals,
ter would be further traumatized. See Respondent's Brief at 5, State v. Bateman, No. A44854
(Or. Ct. App., Dec. 17, 1987).
On the -evening of March 3, 1979, Mr. Bateman kidnapped and sexually abused a nine-
year-old girl. Bateman and the child's mother had become casually acquainted through her
work at a local store. When the child's mother had car trouble, Bateman towed the car to her
apartment. The victim rode with Mr. Bateman. He molested the child in the car, and again
later at his home. He returned the child to her mother at approximately 8:00 a.m. the next
morning. State v. Bateman, 48 Or. App. 357, 360, 616 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1980). A jury con-
victed Bateman of kidnapping in the second degree, OR. REy. STAT. § 163.225 (1971), sod-
omy in the first degree, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.405, and sexual abuse in the first degree, OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.425 (1971). State v. Bateman, 48 Or. App. at 359, 616 P.2d at 1207 (1980).
On December 15, 1980, Mr. Bateman was sentenced to prison for the crimes he commit-
ted on March 3, 1979. Respondent's Brief at 9, Bateman (No. A44854). The court imposed a
five-year prison sentence for sexual abuse in the first degree, a seven-year prison sentence for
kidnapping in the second degree, and a seven-year prison sentence for sodomy in the first
degree. The sentencing order stated that the sentences were to be served concurrently.
While he was in prison, Mr. Bateman did not enter the prison's sex offender program
because he "did not think that he needed treatment." Respondent's Brief at 7. He was paroled
on August 15, 1983, and one year later he was discharged from parole.
. 146. Sentencing Proceedings, State v. Bateman, Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-10-34220 (Or.
Cir. Ct. for Multnomah County, May 20, 1987). At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Bateman
stipulated that he met the criteria of OR. REV. STAT. § 426.675(2) (1977), and the court then
declared him to be a sexually dangerous offender under OR. REV. STAT. § 426.675(3) (1977).
147. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605(3).
148. Judgment and Probation Order at 1, State v. Bateman, Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-
10-34220 (Or. Cir. Ct. for Multnomah County, June 15, 1987).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2. The other conditions were:
(1) that he be incarcerated in the Multnomah County Jail for a period of one year
and that he participate in and successfully complete a thirty (30) day residential alco-
hol treatment program, and upon the completion of said program, the court will
entertain a motion for passes for employment purposes only,
(2) that he maintain full-time employment,
(3) that he abstain from the use of any alcoholic beverages, and further, any pre-
scription drugs/narcotics without prior notification from doctor to defendant's pro-
bation officer,
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alleging error in the imposition of the above conditions. 5' Briefs have
been filed with the Oregon Court of Appeals and oral argument was held
in December 1987.152
(4) that he participate in any sexual offender treatment program as directed by his
probation officer and upon this court's approval,
(5) that he submit to polygraph examination, at his expense, as directed by his pro-
bation officer,
(6) that he submit to random breath testing and/or urinalysis testing upon the re-
quest of his probation officer,
-(7) that he not return within ten (10) blocks of 11300 Northeast Morris Street,
(8) that he have NO contact with minors ....
(10) that he be banned from parks, playgrounds, the zoo, school grounds or any
place where children primarily congregate....
Id. at 1-2.
151. Appellant's Brief at 3, State v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App., Nov. 1987).
152. Defendant-Appellant's Argument
Article I, section 16 of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. From this initial premise, Mr. Bateman
presents case law and arguments which he feels lead to a ruling in his favor. Id. at 26.
Relying on the holdings of Weems and Trop, Mr. Bateman contends that the United
States Supreme Court has found that the Clause prohibits mental as well as physical suffering.
Id. at 22. Bateman points out that in Trop, the Court held that the punishment of involuntary
expatriation "was a 'punishment more primitive than torture' because it necessarily involves a
denial by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human community." Id.
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Mr. Bateman contends that the probation conditions at issue will reduce his social status
to that of a "nonhuman." Id. He takes the position that the signs "will only serve to incite the
public." Id. According to Mr. Bateman, if he is required to follow the probation condition, no
one will want him as a neighbor, no employer will hire him for fear of hurting his or her
business, and, finally, others may avoid him, fearing the implication of associating with him.
Id. at 22-23. "[Mr. Bateman] will be at best shunned from society and at worst subjected to
physical harassment and abuse." Id. at 23. Therefore, the punishment would offend "the fun-
damental premise of the [Clause] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being pos-
sessed of common human dignity." Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273
(1972)).
Mr. Bateman cites the analysis presented in Furman to support his cruel and unusual
punishment argument. Id. In his Furman concurrence, Justice Brennan set forth four factors
to consider when determining whether a challenged punishment is unconstitutional under the
clause:
(1) a "punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human
beings,"
(2) a severe punishment must not be inflicted arbitrarily,
(3) a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society, and
(4) a severe punishment must not be excessive, that is, unnecessary because "it is
nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering" and "there is a significantly
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is
inflicted."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). Mr. Bateman contends that the special
probation conditions at issue fail under each of the four factors. Appellant's Brief at 24, Bate-
man (No. A44854).
Bateman's probation conditions fail under the first factor because, as previously discussed,
under these conditions he would be treated as a nonhuman. The conditions are arbitrary, and
therefore do not meet the second factor, because: (1) the record does not show that the signs
will further protect children or assist Mr. Bateman in re-integrating himself into society; and
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On February 10, 1988, the trial court judge sentenced Mr. Bateman
to ten years in prison for failing to display a sign on his house, in viola-
(2) the probation requirement has not been imposed upon other sex offenders and is thus
unique to Mr. Bateman among sex offenders in Oregon. Mr. Bateman sets forth two argu-
ments to show the probation requirements don't meet the third factor. First, "rejection by
society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with
human dignity." Id. at 23-24 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 277) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Second, the conditions are not acceptable to contemporary society, because the purpose of
Oregon's penal laws is reformation, not retribution. Finally, the special conditions fail the
fourth factor, because Mr. Bateman's other probation conditions make these special conditions
unnecessary. Id. at 24.
Mr. Bateman's defense relies on the holdings of Weems and Trop and Brennan's Furman
concurrence. He did not present a proportionality argument.
Plaintiff-Respondent's Argument
The State points out that the Supreme Court is extremely reluctant to question the appro-
priateness of criminal statutes. Id. at 32. To support this argument, the State cites the Solem
and Weems cases. Id. The State also points out that the Trop decision was a plurality opinion
and argues that "[e]ven when faced with such a rare and severe penalty imposed for a rela-
tively minor violation, only four members of the Court found the punishment unconstitution-
ally cruel and unusual." Id. at 33. According to the State, the Supreme Court is only
concerned with the "imposition of extreme punishments-death, unnecessary and wanton in-
fliction of pain, unusually extensive incarceration, [and] involuntary expatriation-that are
grossly disproportionate in fact to the offense committed." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). To
preclude the probation conditions at issue would "trivialize" the Clause. Id.
The State also points out that Mr. Bateman was unable to cite any case in which a proba-
tion condition was found to be in violation of the Clause, or was seriously analyzed under the
Clause. Id. at 34-35. The State relies on the McDowell and Goldschmitt cases to support its
position "that a probation condition, notwithstanding that it requires the probationer to self-
disclose his crime publicly, is not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual ... ." Id. at 37.
In response to Mr. Bateman's analogy of his sentence to the pillory, the State argues that
even if this "pillory sentence" was assumed to be cruel and unusual punishment under the
Clause, Mr. Bateman has not been sentenced involuntarily to the pillory. Id. at 28-29. Mr.
Bateman can avoid imprisonment by "voluntarily" posting the signs. Id. at 29 (emphasis in
original). From this, the State argues that while he has no right to declare probation or to
dictate its terms, Mr. Bateman holds the power to refuse to comply with the special probation
conditions. Id. at 27-28. If he refuses to comply or fails to comply with the probation condi-
tions, Mr. Bateman is subject only to the revocation of the probation and imposition of the
original sentence. Id. at 28.
Upon his conviction, Mr. Bateman could have received a "straight time" sentence of up to
ten years' imprisonment and a $200,000 fine. OR. REv. STAT. § § 161.605(3) (1971),
161.625(1) (1981). Although he did not challenge this potential sentence, the State argues that
the sentence would pass constitutional muster if challenged, particularly because of his prior
record. Respondent's Brief, at 27. The State then argues that the five-year special probation
conditions are a less severe infringement of Mr. Bateman's liberty than ten years of imprison-
ment, and since the latter punishment would not be unconstitutional, neither would the for-
mer. Id.
The State also contends that the special probation conditions are not cruel and unusual
punishment because Bateman chose probation rather than risk imposition of a straight sen-
tence of up to ten years. Id. at 27-28. The State claims it is a fair assumption that if compli-
ance with the conditions were in fact more onerous upon Mr. Bateman than the straight time
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tion of his ninth special probation condition. 153 On December 14, 1988,
the Oregon Court of Appeals dismissed Bateman's appeal as moot, be-
cause the trial court revoked his probation after he filed the appeal.154
Bateman has filed a second appeal but no decision has been rendered. 155
Mr. Bateman contends that the special probation conditions that re-
quire him to place signs reading, "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER -
NO CHILDREN ALLOWED" on the doors of his residence and vehicle
are invalid because they constitute cruel and unusual punishment.15 6 He
argues that he will be exposed to public humiliation and abuse as a direct
result of the signs.157
Mr. Bateman contends that the purpose of the signs is retribution,
rather than the ostensible purposes of probation, reformation, and reha-
bilitation. Also, he argues, the signs will not assist him in reforming him-
self and re-integrating himself into society. Instead, "[t]hey inform him
and the public that he does not deserve to be treated as a human be-
ing." 1 58 This probation condition hinders the' real purposes for proba-
tion. Therefore, the special probation conditions at issue should be held
invalid.'
59
The State contends that the special probation conditions at issue are
not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 160
The State argues that the conditions challenged are "substantially less
punishment,"'' both quantitatively and qualitatively, than Mr. Bateman
could have received for his crimes under the applicable sentencing stat-
utes.1 62 The State believes that the probation conditions are "ultimately
optional,"' 163 and that any adverse consequences Bateman might suffer,
such as extreme difficulty in finding a place to live or employment, are
"completely speculative."' 6 Finally, the State argues 'that the probation
conditions do not even approach, in concept or effect, the extreme penal-
and fine sentence, he would then simply refuse to comply with the conditions and thereby risk
imposition of the straight time and fine as the less onerous alternative. Id. at 28..
Finally, the State dismisses Mr. Bateman's concerns about the public's reaction to the
signs as "completely speculative." Id. at 47. If "collateral consequences" should arise, Mr.
Bateman "may seek modification of the [probation] condition[s]." "Id. at 48.
153. L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, Part I, at 2, col. 5.
154. State v. Bateman, 94 Or. App. 449 (1988).
155. Telephone interview with Diane L. Alessi, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, Or. (Jan.
20, 1989).
156. Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Bateman (No. A44854).
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Respondent's Brief at 1, Bateman (No. A44854).
161. Id. at 31.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 37.
164. Id. at 47.
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ties that have troubled the Supreme Court under the Clause.165 There-
fore, according to the State, the probation conditions at issue are not
cruel and unusual punishment under the Clause.166
"Thus the young and pure would be taught to look at her, with the scar-
let letter flaming on her breast ... as the figure, the body, the reality of
sin."
' 167
1. Eighth Amendment Analysis of Bateman's Sentence
Imposition of Mr. Bateman's challenged probation conditions could
result in his banishment from society. The Supreme Court has held that
such punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. In
Trop v. Dulles, the imposition of involuntary exile upon Mr. Trop and the
consequent uncertainty and anxiety he would suffer made the punish-
ment in Trop v. Dulles unconstitutional. 168 The Trop Court felt that exil-
ing Mr. Trop would subject him to "a fate of ever-increasing fears and
distress," never knowing "what discriminations may be established
against him." 169 He might be sibject to "banishment, a fate universally
decried by civilized people."17 In his Trop concurrence, Justice Brennan
added:
[I]t can be supposed that the consequences of greatest weight in
terms of ultimate impact on the petitioner, are unknown and un-
knowable. Indeed, in truth, he may live out his life with but minor
inconvenience. [However], [t]he uncertainty, and the constant psy-
chological hurt, which must accompany one who becomes an out-
cast in his own land must be reckoned a substantial factor in the
ultimate judgment. 
171
Society despises child molesters; therefore, Mr. Bateman, like Mr.
Trop, could be banished from society if he is required to display the
signs. 172 Mr. Bateman will probably have a difficult time finding a place
to live and work. 173 In addition, public reaction from those who associ-
165. IM at 37.
166. Id.
167. N. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 60-61.
168. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); see supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
169. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 110 (Brennan, J. concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
172. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
173. Id. When Mr. Bateman was arrested for violating his ninth special probation condi-
tion, mandating that he display a sign on his home, he was working under a fictitious name as
a drywall installer. His former employer stated that he would not have hired Bateman had he
known his true identity. Lerten, U.P.I., Feb. 7, 1988 (NEXIS).
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ate the signs with him will add to the psychological hurt caused by the
signs directly. Mr. Bateman will be put in an uncertain position, not
knowing what discriminations will be directed at him. Given the crime
he committed and the public's opinion about such crimes, Mr. Bateman
could be subject to a more severe public reaction than the reaction Mr.
Trop would have experienced had his sentence been upheld.
The force of public reaction to a perceived stigma was painfully il-
lustrated in another context. In Arcadia, Florida, Clifford Ray obtained
a court order allowing his three hemophilic sons, who had all tested posi-
tive for AIDS antibodies, to enroll in school.174 Public reaction to the
court order and the boys' presence was startling. Five hundred people
showed up for a "Citizens Against AIDS" rally; almost half of the
school's students boycotted the first day of class; bomb threats at the
school forced the children out of classes three times in one week; and an
arsonist's fire gutted the Ray's home. 7 '
The AIDS virus is not spread through casual contact, like that
which occurs among children at school.76 The virus is most often
spread through sexual contact, sharing of contaminated needles by intra-
venous drug users, contaminated blood products, or from an infected
mother to her child during pregnancy.177 The Ray boys could not spread
the AIDS virus to other students by being in the same classroom with
them, yet some members of the public reacted violently. One explana-
tion for this severe reaction is that parents perceived the AIDS virus as a
threat to their children.
The public can also easily perceive Mr. Bateman as a threat to chil-
dren. Bateman has proven himself an active threat to children; his crimi-
nal behavior, his failure to enroll in a sex therapy group, and his own
admissions support this conclusion. Once he is identified by the signs on
his house and car, there is a good chance that Mr. Bateman will receive
reactions similar to, or worse than, those received by the Ray family.
Forcing Mr. Bateman to comply with the conditions at issue will provide
each member of society with the opportunity to persecute him. This per-
secution cannot be allowed. The state, not the general public, must deal
with violations of law. Mr. Bateman should not be put in this vulnerable
position merely for the sake of reducing Oregon's prison population.
174. Monmaniu, No Escaping the Dilemma of Kids with AIDS in School, Newsweek, Sept.
7, 1987, at 52, col. 1.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Clark, Cosnell, Witherspoon, Hager & Coppola, AIDS, Newsweek, Aug.
12, 1985, at 20-27 (AIDS cannot be spread through casual contact).
177. 103 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH RE-
PORTS 96-97 (1988).
2. Issues Raised by the State
In its case against Mr. Bateman, the State correctly argued that the
United States Supreme Court resists reviewing the appropriateness of
criminal sentences: "Reviewing courts, of course should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that [state] legislatures necessarily pos-
sess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as
well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted
criminals."' 78 Notwithstanding this broad discretion, however, the So-
lem Court provided a caveat aimed at overzealous sentencing authorities:
"no penalty is per se constitutional."' 79
In each of the cases cited by the state in support of this point, the
challenged sentence was legislatively mandated, 180 not an exercise of the
court's discretion. In Bateman, Judge Baker exercised her legislatively
mandated discretion to "impose special conditions of probation for the
protection of the public or reformation of the offender, or both." 181
There is an important distinction between legislatively mandated
sentences and those arising from a judge's discretion. As pointed out by
Justice Frankfurter,
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a
good reflex of a democratic society .... History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
controlled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsi-
bility in choosing between competing political, economic and social
pressures.1
82
Judge Baker may have acted on her feelings and those of the public
178. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (emphasis added).
179. Id
180. Solem, 463 U.S. 277 ("Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary
[without parole]," S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 22-6-1(6), (7) (Supp. 1982)); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ("The penalties of cadena temporal and a fine from 1,250 and
12,500 pesetas shall be imposed on a public official who, taking advantage of his authority,
shall commit a falsification," CODIGO PENAL [C. PENAL] ch. 4, § 1, art. 300 (Spain); "The
punishment of cadena temporal is from twelve years and one day to twenty years," Id. at arts.
28, 96; "[They shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be
employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without
the institution," Id. at arts. 105, 106); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 680 (1962) ("No per-
son shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics .... Any
person convicted of violating a provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail,"
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1963), repealed by ch. 1407, § 2, 1972 Cal.
Stat. 2987); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ("[A] person who is a national of the United
States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by ... deserting the mili-
tary, air, or naval forces of the United States in the time of war .. " 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8)
(1952) (repealed 1978)).
181. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(2) (1983).
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when she imposed the ninth and eleventh special probation conditions"8 3
on Mr. Bateman. These special conditions were proposed by the mother
of one of the victims.184 No evidentiary hearings were held, nor was tes-
timony given concerning the possible consequences associated with such
unusual probation conditions.
The State also argued that the special probation conditions are vol-
untary, in that Mr. Bateman could choose imprisonment at any time by
refusing to follow the conditions of his probation. A similar argument
was presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Brown,"'
and summarily dismissed. In Brown, the defendants were convicted of
first-degree sexual assault'86 arising from a brutal rape.'87 The trial court
judge gave each defendant a choice between the maximum sentence of
thirty years of imprisonment, or five years of probation, provided the
defendant voluntarily agreed to be surgically castrated.
188
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that trial court judges
are "allowed a wide, but not unlimited, discretion in imposing conditions
of suspension or probation and they-cannot impose conditions which are
illegal and void as against public policy."1 89 For support, the court cited
a case in which the trial court judge did not have the authority to impose
banishment from South Carolina as a condition of probation, even
though the defendant agreed to the sentence, because such a condition
violated public policy.' 90 The public policy of South Carolina is derived
by implication from the established law of the state, as found in its Con-
stitution, statutes, and judicial decisions."' The South Carolina Consti-
tution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; castration, a form of
mutilation, is prohibited.' 92 Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme
Court remanded for resentencing.
19 3
The respondent presents a vulnerable argument when it relies on
People v. McDowell194 and Goldschmitt v. State 195 in support of its posi-
tion in the Bateman case. Granted, the courts in those cases did not
accept the cruel and unusual punishment arguments, but both cases are
183. See supra text accompanying note 150.
184. Proceedings at 17, Bateman (Nos. C85-08-33209 and C85-10-34220).
185. 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (Supp.'1983).
187. 284 S.C. at 409, 326 S.E.2d at 411.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 410, 326 S.E.2d at 411.
190. Henry v. State, 276 S.C. 515, 280 S.E.2d 536 (1981).
191. Brown, 284 S.C. at 410, 326 S.E.2d at 412 (citing Batchelor v. American Health Ins.
Co., 234 S.C. 103, 107 S.E.2d 36 (1959)).'
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976) (Defendant convicted of purse snatch-
ing; sentence provided that he had to wear leather soled shoes with metal taps at the toe and
heel whenever he left his house).
195. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
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distinguishable from Mr. Bateman's case. McDowell argued that the re-
quirement that he wear "tap shoes" was tantamount "to hanging a sign
around [his] neck that says, 'I'm a thief.' ",196 The court noted that few
people would think that someone wearing tap shoes is a thief.197 In stark
contrast, the location, size, and content of Mr. Bateman's signs will send
a clear message to the public that he is a child molester.
Mr. Goldschmitt's bumper sticker also sends a clear message to
those who read it that Mr. Goldschmitt was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol. But, despite the public sentiment against drink-
ing and driving, the public's reaction to Mr. Goldschmitt's bumper
sticker is unlikely to be as volatile as its reaction to Mr. Bateman's signs.
If the Oregon Court of Appeals affis Mr. Bateman's special pro-
bation conditions, there may well be another appeal, for if the conditions
are approved, Mr. Bateman will find himself like Hester Prynne on trial
today, tomorrow, and each day he lives under these probation
conditions.
IV. Standard for Judicial Review of Scarlet Letter Sentences
When reviewing the constitutionality of a scarlet letter sentence to
determine if it violates the Clause, a court should do a two-step analysis.
First, the court should determine the potential public reaction to the
crime committed. Second, the court should look at the particular sen-
tence to determine the possibility and duration of public persecution.
A scarlet letter sentence, by definition, apprises the public of a con-
victed defendant's criminal conduct and thus exposes the individual to
possible persecution by members of the public. A person convicted of
jaywalking who is given a scarlet letter sentence will probably be exposed
to little or no mental or physical abuse by the public. Whereas, a person
convicted of sexual abuse who is given a scarlet letter sentence will prob-
ably be exposed to substantial mental or physical abuse by the public.
The court must determine how the public is likely to react. If the nature
of the crime and the public's knowledge of its commission expose the
convicted defendant to little or no public persecution, then the sentence
should be found to be constitutional. However, if the individual is ex-
posed to substantial public persecution, then the court should find the
sentence to be an unconstitutional violation of the Clause.
In conjunction with the first step of the analysis, the court should
look to the particular sentence in order to determine the possibility and
duration of the persecution. Publishing an apology in a newspaper prob-
ably creates less public persecution than posting the same apology on
one's car door. A newspaper scarlet letter may not be seen by those who
read the paper, could be forgotten by those who do read it, and even
196. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
197. Id.
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those who read it and remember it may not associate it with the individ-
ual. Therefore, the possibility of public persecution is reduced. When the
scarlet letter appears on the individuals's car door, however, people will
probably see it. Because it is unusual, people are likely to remember it.
Finally, those who see the individual in his or her car will associate that
individual with the signs. Therefore, the possibility of public persecution
is greater in this latter situation simply because of the type of scarlet
letter imposed.
Conclusion
Current sentencing attitudes have led to an unacceptable increase in
prison populations and operating costs. But these problems need well-
thought-out, constitutional solutions. In response to prison overcrowd-
ing, some judges have devised creative sentences, including scarlet letter
probation conditions. While these sentences address prison overpopula-
tion and operating cost problems, they create a new problem: the possi-
bility of infringing on defendants' eighth amendment rights.
The Eighth Amendment protects convicted individuals from cruel
and unusual punishments. The court would probably use the judicially
created unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain test to determine the
constitutionality of a non-capital, non-incarceration sentence. When ap-
plying the test to a scarlet letter sentence, the court should do a two-step
analysis. First, the court should determine the potential public reaction
to the crime committed. Second, the court should look at the particular
sentence to determine the possibility and duration of public persecution.
Trial courts are responsible for determining a convicted criminal's
sentence. Scarlet letter sentences risk putting the judicial function into
the hands of the general public because one of the goals of a scarlet letter
sentence is to increase public awareness of the identity of criminals. Ap-
pellate courts should hold such sentences unconstitutional when the par-
ticular scarlet letter sentence will expose the convicted individual to
public persecution.
"Hester Prynne's term of confinement was now at an end .... To-mor-
row would bring its own trial with it; so would the next day, and so
would the next; each its own trial." '198
By Gregory M. Brown*
198. N. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 60.
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